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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the notion of "the law of war" dates back to
antiquity,' the modern treaty framework for the Law of
International Armed Conflict ("LOIAC") finds its origins in the
mid-nineteenth century.2 Treaties such as the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are still
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1 See, e.g., Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural
Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F. L. REV. 277, 280-82 (1997) (discussing
elements of the law of war dating back to the time of Xerxes).
2 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HosTILITIEs UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 9 (2004) (describing the origins of LOIAC).
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central to LOIAC and, by extension, to determinations made on the
modern battlefield.3 Warfare, however, has changed since the time
those instruments were authored. Rather than large-scale clashes
of military might backed by sovereign states, contemporary
warfare is characterized by long-term counterinsurgency and
stability operations typified by the ongoing struggles in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As the U.S. Army Field Manual on
Counterinsurgency notes, "large main force engagements that
characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations
Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become
the exceptions in American warfare." 4  The Field Manual
continues:
Following the end of the Cold War, the Army began
reducing force structure while preparing to reap the
benefits of a new era of peace. The benefits of this "peace
dividend" were never realized. The strategic environment
evolved from one characterized by the bipolar nature of the
relationship between the world's dominant powers to one
of shared responsibility across the international
community. In the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the Army led or participated in more than 15 stability
operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia,
Somalia, and the Balkans. Many of these efforts continued
into the new century, and incursions into Afghanistan and
Iraq revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world: the
collapse of established governments, the rise of
international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly
endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty.
The global implications of such destabilizing forces proved
staggering. 5
Over that period of time, however, legal developments in the
traditional LOIAC canon did not fully match this Copernican shift
in the paradigm of armed conflict.6 But this did not mean a
3 Id. at 9-11.
4 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL (INTERIM) 3-07.22, COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATIONS vi (Oct. 2004).
5 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07, STABILITY OPERATIONS, T 1-9 (Oct.
2008) [hereinafter FM 3-07].
6 See Ren6 Provost, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 2
(2002) (noting that "[bly the late 1960s, international humanitarian law stood at a
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cessation in legal development across the international plane. To
the contrary, standing out in stark relief against the backdrop of
relative inactivity in LOIAC was the surfeit of activity in the field
of international human rights law. Since the end of World War II,
the field of human rights has rapidly developed and manifested
itself as a dramatic new force in the ancient realm of international
law.7
This rapid development is made even more significant due to
vast swath of subject matter potentially impacted by human rights.
Brownlie notes that "[h]uman rights is a broad area of concern and
the potential subject matter ranges from the questions of torture
and fair trial to the so-called third generation of rights, which
includes the right to economic development and the right to
health." 8 Accordingly, much like a tree growing in a fence line,
international human rights law has become inextricably entangled
with the law of armed conflict and has ramified in such a manner
that-given the nature of contemporary conflict-it is no longer
possible to address one without also dealing with the other.9
There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between LOIAC
and international human rights law-principally in the types of
protections given and the circumstances in which those guarantees
apply.1° Likewise, Professor Ren6 Provost, in his excellent book on
the subject, notes that a key feature of international human rights
law is the "universality" of its application-the idea that these
rights are granted to everyone regardless of nationality or
allegiance.11 In contrast, protections under LOIAC are conditional
standstill" while "[hiuman rights law, on the other hand, was experiencing a great
boom").
7 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 529 (6th ed. 2003).
8 Id.
9 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
239, 243-44 (2000) ("The current changing nature of conflicts from international to
internal is closely related to the normative developments. Internal conflicts have
necessitated both new norms and reinterpretation of existing norms. The change
in direction toward intrastate or mixed conflicts -the context of contemporary
atrocities -has drawn humanitarian law in the direction of human rights law.").
10 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 22 ("Ordinary (peacetime) human rights are
frequently subject to restrictions, which can be placed on their exercise 'in the
interests of national security or public safety'. Even more significantly, the
application of ordinary (peacetime) human rights - whether or not restricted - can
usually be derogated from in time of international armed conflict.").
11 Provost, supra note 6, at 24-25 ("[R]ights are given to everyone, including
nationals of states not bound by the same norm and stateless individuals.").
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based upon the status of the individual and the circumstances.
Otherwise stated, the protections given under the law of armed
conflict depend on largely on one's membership in a certain group
or class of individuals.' 2
The difference in protections granted by these distinct legal
regimes has been generally reconciled through the application of
what amounts to a matrix of applicable instruments and non-
applicable instruments, derogable rights and non-derogable
rights.13 As Dinstein notes, "[w]hen derogation from ordinary
(peacetime) human rights occurs, one can say that LOIAC (war-
oriented) human rights fill much of the vacant space. This is of
particular import if due process of law is imperiled. Peacetime
judicial guarantees may be derogated from in wartime, yet LOIAC
introduces other minimum guarantees in their place." 14  In
ordinary armed conflict, this model may have served to
successfully mute the significance of international human rights
law in military decision-making. The nature of contemporary
stability operations and counterinsurgency, however, has
broadened the scope of military operations so that commanders
must now engage in a range of activities outside of those normally
considered combat-related.' 5 Concomitant with this expanded
range of military responsibility is an expanded range of legal
responsibility that implicates different areas of law - some of
12 See id. at 34-42 (discussing the conditionality of protections under the law
of armed conflict).
13 DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 22.
14 Id. at 23.
15 The Interim Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations states:
When supporting a counterinsurgency, the US and its multinational
partners assist the [host nation] in implementing a sustainable approach.
To the extent the [host nation] has its basic institutions and security
forces intact, the burden upon US and multinational forces and resources
is lessened. To the extent the [host nation] is lacking basic institutions
and functions, the burden upon the US and multinational forces is
increased. In the extreme, rather than building upon what is, the US and
other nations will find themselves creating elements (such as local forces
and government institutions) [sic] of the society they have been sent to
assist. Military forces thus become involved in nation building while
simultaneously attempting to defeat an insurgency. US forces often lead
because the US military) can quickly project and sustain a force. This
involves them in a host of current activities regarded as nonstandard,
from supervising elections to restoring power and facilitating and
conducting schooling.
FM 3-07.22, supra note 4, 1-40.
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which were not formally part of the traditional juridico-military
calculus.
This Article will briefly identify the general implications of this
legal trend and highlight some ongoing developments that will
further impact the changing aspect of LOIAC. In so doing, this
Article seeks to illuminate some notable aspects of the legal
landscape that looms before military commanders and their
advisors. It also seeks to shed light on events and trends in
international human rights law that will have direct bearing on
military operations in the coming years.
2. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: APPLICATION OF JURISDICTION TO MILITARY
OPERATIONS ABROAD
An area of rapid development in international human rights
law is that of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be defined as the
authority to affect legal interests -to prescribe rules of law, to
adjudicate legal questions, and to compel, induce compliance, or
take any other enforcement action. The term "jurisdiction" derives
from the Latin words juris (law) and dictio (saying), meaning "the
implication being an authoritative legal pronouncement." 16
Jurisdiction is the means of making law functional; it is the way
that states and legal institutions make law a reality. Any definition
of crime and any institution that calls for the law's application to
its subjects or objects necessarily include a jurisdictional breadth -
the temporal and spatial scope of that application.17 Thus, the
issue of where human rights protections apply is essential to
understanding their functionality.
The issue of the extraterritorial scope of human rights
protections that suppress military wrongdoing and control armed
forces in foreign territory is one that has been recently before
various judicial bodies across the globe. The nature of that reach
necessarily implicates the relationship between LOIAC and
international human rights law. While it is axiomatic that LOIAC
16 See Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW at Ch. 2.1 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008); ROLLIN M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 38 (3d ed. 1982); Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan
Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st
Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 12 (2006) [hereinafter Myopia].
17 See Blakesley & Stigall, Myopia, supra note 16, at 1, 12 (comparing theories
of jurisdiction).
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obligates members of an armed force when they operate on the
territory of another country,18 it is, however, currently less clear
which human rights protections apply to control a military force
operating in a foreign territory. To what extent does human rights
law apply to protect the civilian populace and to punish those who
commit violations? "In view of the purposes and objects of human
rights treaties, there is no a priori reason to limit a state's obligation
to respect human rights to its national territory." 19 Indeed, the
rapidly evolving nature of crime, warfare, and human rights
violations necessitate this conceptual shift.20 Yet, various countries,
regional organizations, and international organizations differ in
their positions on the proper extraterritorial application or
jurisdictional scope of their own and international human rights
norms.
21
18 Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
78, 78 (1995).
19 Id. at 80.
20 The United States and other national courts have expanded the traditional
bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, responding largely to a perceived burgeoning
of transnational and international crime. The Congress and U.S. courts in the "war
on drugs," for example, have sought to deter narcotics importation by asserting
jurisdiction over thwarted extraterritorial conspiracies and, in the "war on terror,"
have asserted jurisdiction over alleged terrorists who have committed their
violence outside U.S. territory. Cooperation among governments in investigation
and extradition is of paramount importance to combating international and
transnational crime. Hence, a state requesting assistance in criminal matters must
conform to any and all limitations and requirements made by the requested state
and those of international law. Any disparagement of a nation's sovereignty,
international law, treaty formulations, or agreements to extradite or otherwise
cooperate will ultimately harm the effectiveness of international crime prevention
and criminal justice. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 16, at 89. See also
Blakesley & Stigall, Myopia, supra note 16, at 44-45 (discussing the extraterritorial
application of U.S. criminal statutes, particularly cyber-based sexual exploitation
laws).
21 See, e.g., R v. Sec'y of State for Def. (AI-Skeini) [2007] UKHL 26, 13
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases
/UKHL/2007/26html (constructing extraterritorial application of laws narrowly);
Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567 (2004) (holding that the plaintiffs were not
considered within the jurisdiction of the respondent state); Bankovic v. Belgium,
11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 435 (2001) (holding that applicants did not come within the
jurisdiction of the respondent States on account of an extraterritorial act); Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding "that neither statute
generally prohibiting Attorney General from deporting or returning aliens to
country where aliens' life or freedom would be threatened on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in particular social group, or political opinion,
nor parallel article of the United Nations Convention Relating to Status of
Refugees applied to actions taken by Coast Guard on high seas"); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding "that the Fourth Amendment did
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An interesting case in that regard is the Al-Skeini decision,22 in
which the British House of Lords faced the issue of jurisdiction
over crimes committed by British troops in Iraq and was required
to determine the proper bearing of a human rights instrument. Al-
Skeini centered on application of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHR") and the British Human Rights Act, which incorporated
the ECHR into British law. In that case, the House of Lords held
that the ECHR applied to acts of British armed forces in Iraq within
their military prisons only-and not to other areas under the
control of British forces.23 Thus, their Lordships suggested that
Britain lacked jurisdiction over British soldiers who killed civilians
while in action abroad. In so holding, they misinterpreted
decisions of the Council of Europe on the ECHR and erroneously
indicated that the soldiers' conduct did not fall within ECHR
jurisdiction.
Among the problems with the House of Lords decision was a
failure to properly understand the impact of customary
not apply to the search by American authorities of the Mexican residence of a
Mexican citizen and resident who had no voluntary attachment to the United
States"); United States v. Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding "that the
District Court had jurisdiction to try Mexican national who had been forcibly
kidnapped and brought to the United States").
22 Al-Skeini, [20071 UKHL 26. See also Tobias Thienel, The ECHR in Iraq: The
Judgment of the House of Lords in R (Al-Skeini) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 6 J.
INT'L GRIM. JUST. 115 (2008) (analyzing the A1-Skeini decision); Kerem Altiparmak,
Human Rights Act: Extra-territorial Application: A1-Skeini and Others v. Secretary of
State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, 72J. CRIM. L. 27 (2008).
23 Ralph Wilde notes that:
[t]he case of [Al-Skeini], decided by the House of Lords on June 13, 2007,
concerned the applicability of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act
to the United Kingdom in Iraq. Since, by a majority of four to one, the
Law Lords tied the extraterritorial meaning of the Human Rights Act to
that of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the case
involved a detailed consideration of the extraterritorial meaning of the
term "jurisdiction," the trigger for applicability, in Article 1 of that
treaty-a term also used in this way in other human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). The Court held that jurisdiction was triggered in relation to a
UK-run detention facility, but not in relation to streets and private
houses where UK soldiers were temporarily present
Ralph Wilde, International Decisions: R (On the Application of Al-Skeini) v.
Secretary of State for Defense: UK House of Lords opinions on whether the European
Convention on Human Rights, as implemented through the 1998 Human Rights Act, has
extraterritorial effect, 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 628, 635 (2008).
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international law and the acceptable and necessary theories of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Even, however, when the House of
Lords got extraterritorial jurisdiction right, the underlying
rationale was problematic. For instance, the House correctly held
that the killing of an Iraqi in a British controlled prison was within
ECHR jurisdiction.24 To reach its conclusion, however, the House
interpreted effective control of an area in a foreign country to
include only specific pieces of territory, like a prison or an
embassy. 25 To reach this result, it misread several European Court
of Human Rights ("ECtHR") decisions and incorrectly applied the
rules and presumptions it referenced. 26
In Issa v. Turkey, although the European Court held that Turkey
did not exercise effective control over the area in Iraq, the rule of
the decision was clear that,
[a] state may be held accountable for violation of the
[ECHR] rights and freedoms of persons who are in the
territory of another State but who are found to be under the
former State's authority and control through its agents
operating - whether lawfully or unlawfully - in the latter
State... . Accountability in such situations stems from the
fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted
so as to allow a State party to perpetuate violations of the
24 See Wilde, supra note 23; compare Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, with Issa, 41
Eur. Ct. H.R. 567, and Bankovic, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 435 (noting in an exercise of
dualism, that the House of Lords has made precedent from the Council of Europe
Human Rights decisions persuasive rather than binding). See also Thienel, supra
note 22, at 117 n.12 (arguing that, of course, judicial precedent is only persuasive
authority in civil law systems and in international law) (citing R (Alconbury
Developments Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
Regions [2001] UKHL 23, 26 (Lord Slynn of Hadley)).
25 See Thienel, supra note 22 at 115.
26 The House interpreted the Issa decision to be inconsistent with Bankovi ,
incorrectly reading the holdings of these decisions. See Thienel, supra note 22, at
119. But see id. at 117(critiquing this interpretation). See also id. at 118-22
(analyzing Al-Skeini, [2007] WLR 26, and its comparing of Bankovic, 11 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 435 with Issa, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567). For as similar discussion, see Loizidou v.
Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Loizidou v.
Turkey (Merits) No. 15318/89, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); Djavit v. Turkey, 111 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 231 (2003); Ila~cu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179; Cyprus v.
Turkey 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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Convention on the territory of another State, which it could
not perpetrate in its own territory .... 27
The rule under the European Charter is, therefore, that effective
control of an area in another country by a state under the
jurisdiction of the ECHR establishes the obligation to follow the
protections of the ECHR and the obligation to hold those who
violate them accountable. It is a strange idea, indeed, to suggest
that a country's law cannot apply to criminal conduct of its
nationals, to say nothing of its very agents, just because they are
abroad when they violate the law.28 The proper rule in situations
of military occupation or control is to apply basic human rights
norms extraterritorially, especially if the domestic legal system of
the territory in which the conduct occurred is not able to apply.29
This is simple active nationality jurisdiction.
Whether the Al-Skeini decision represents a legal anomaly or
demonstrates a reticent trend among domestic courts is difficult to
predict. One way or the other, however, the case clearly
demonstrates that questions of international human rights law are
now part and parcel of modern military operations-even if (for
now) UK law confines the ECHR's reach to specific locales.
The holding of Al-Skeini notwithstanding, the extraterritorial
application of jus cogens human rights norms is by definition
universal.30  The suggestion that application of these norms
extraterritorially is a form of cultural imperialism is preposterous. 31
Even if some governments torture their alleged "enemies," or have
their military do the same in military operations or prisons, these
very same governments consider that same conduct to be
27 Issa, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 367, 71; see also Thienel, supra note 22, at 119
(containing similar analysis and reasoning).
28 See Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26; Thienal, supra note 22.
29 Territories in the midst of violence rarely have functioning legal systems to
enforce their own domestic laws. Many examples exist in which jurisdiction on
the basis of the perpetrator's nationality was applied, because no other authority
was available. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890) (U.S. national
prosecuted in the United States for murder committed on an uninhabited bat
guano island).
30 See Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 16, at 124; Blakesley &
Stigall, Myopia, supra note 17, at 28-33 (arguing that nations with competent
jurisdition have to duty to prosecute some transgressions "condemned by
virtually all domestic law.").
31 Yet this is what the House of Lords claimed in AI-Skieni, [20071 UKH-L 26
78, 90, 97, and discussed in Thienel, supra note 22, at 122.
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quintessentially criminal when committed against them. Similarly,
even when a military uses rape as a means to their military ends,
they hold that conduct as criminal when done to their own. 32 The
same principle holds for insurgent groups who commit those
atrocities. 33 Therefore, any human rights protection that holds a jus
cogens nature has universal applicability, by definition.34 Many
other human rights norms apply extraterritorially by virtue of
other bases of jurisdiction, such as the nationality principle and the
effective control of an area in another country's territory. As
former president and current judge of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Theodor Meron stated,
"[n]arrow territorial interpretation of human rights treaties is
anathema to the basic idea of human rights, which is to ensure that
a state should respect human rights of persons over whom it
exercises jurisdiction."35
Al-Skeini - even if based on a dubious rationale - is nonetheless
illustrative of how military operations must be reconciled with
international human rights norms. Even under Al-Skeini's narrow
logic, international human rights law still applies as a means to
limit the conduct of soldiers in certain regards. A more expansive
understanding of the jurisdiction of international human rights
instruments (as articulated above) would necessarily lead to the
consideration of human rights norms in a greater set of
circumstances.
3. THE COPENHAGEN PROCESS ON HANDLING DETAINEES IN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS
As demonstrated above, the treatment of detainees is a prime
example of the expanded range of legal responsibility that
implicates different areas of law. Continuing with that theme,
Denmark's "ambition to establish a common platform for the
handling of detainees" is illustrative of how intertwined strands of
international human rights law and LOIAC have become.36 It may
32 See Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 16, at 124-36; see also
text accompanying note 16.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Meron, supra note 19, at 82.
36 Marie-Louise Overvad, Danish Ambassador, United Nations, Statement at
the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (Nov. 29,
2007), available at http://www.missionfngeneve.um.dk/en/menu
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also represent a way, if not to cut the Gordian knot, then to move
past it, with a better recognition of how both legal strands will
influence future military operations.
The "Copenhagen Process" is an international legal reform
initiative, launched in 2007 by the government of Denmark, in an
effort to establish a common framework on handling detainees for
all troop-contributing countries in a given operation. 37 Signaling
the above-mentioned trend, the overall process seeks to "bridge the
gap of understanding and practice which [is] currently [left] to
troop-contributing countries to deal with challenges involved on a
bilateral or an ad hoc basis." 38 Denmark's motivation for heading
this effort stems from its support of various peacekeeping
missions, including those in Cyprus, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.39
The government of Denmark is also involved in counter-piracy
operations near the Horn of Africa to protect food transports. 40 Yet
it is the Danish involvement in Afghanistan which seems their
primary motivation. From the Danish perspective, the conflict in
Afghanistan highlights the gaps in LOIAC-gaps which they
believe have lead to inconsistent handling and treatment of
detainees.41
Denmark has firsthand knowledge of the broad spectrum of
challenges created by the handling of detainees. In 2002, Danish
troops captured thirty-four Afghanistan citizens and turned them
/STATEMENTS/30thlnternationalConferenceOfTheRedCrossAndTheRedCresce
nt.htm.
37 See Thomas Winkler, Acting Legal Advisor, Danish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Address at the 31st Round Table on Current Issues of Humanitarian Law
(Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://en.calameo.com/read/00000837926fb084b36c9
(discussing why Denmark decided to launch the Copenhagen Process).
38 Id. at 6.
39 Id. at 2.
40 Id. at 3.
41 Ambassador Peter Taksoe-Jensen, Under Secretary for Legal Affairs,
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comments at the meeting: The International
Legal Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism 4 (Dec. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/717CA9FC-C924-4FED-B9E8-4DF3CF6F2A62
/0/TalePTJterrorIHLwashingtonDEC.doc. In the meeting, hosted by the German
Marshall Fund of the United States and The Royal Danish Embassy, Ambassador
Jensen explained how the handling of detainees is "[a] practical day-to-day
challenge for [] soldiers in the field" as well as "[a] long-term political challenge
for the countries wishing to contribute to international military efforts while at the
same time respecting and implementing in good faith all our international
obligations." Id.
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over to U.S. forces, who allegedly tortured the Afghans. 42 A
subsequent documentary film generated widespread criticism. 43
More recently, in 2008, Danish forces detained two individuals and
transferred them to the Afghan National Directorate of Security. 44
To quote the Acting Legal Advisor for the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the individuals then "disappeared," although they
were later found in an Afghan prison serving a five year sentence.45
The Copenhagen Process was viewed as a practical if not ideal
way to identify the proper international legal basis for handling
detainees. Indeed the Danish Undersecretary for Legal Affairs is
on record as stating that from "a strictly legal point of view" there
should be a Fourth Protocol to the Geneva Conventions to deal
with the asymmetric threat posed by international terrorism.46 Yet
the Under Secretary added that "the Harvard process has already
shown-we will never be able to agree and we may risk lowering
the standards of protection."47
Denmark claims that "the Copenhagen Process seeks in no way
to shortcut, devalue or in any other way undermine the already
existing legal framework related to the protection of persons
detained in - or outside of - an armed conflict." 48 In more blunt
terms, the Copenhagen Process is "not seeking to establish new
rules of international law based on the lowest common
denominator." 49 To the contrary, the Danes claim to be seeking
"an improved international common understanding and
42 Press Release, Committee Against Torture, Committee Against Torture




44 Winkler, supra note 37, at 3.
45 Id.
46 Taksoe-Jensen, supra note 41, at 5-6.
47 Id. The "Harvard process" refers to a 2003 meeting of experts from the
International Committee of the Red Cross, government officials from several
countries, and scholars held at Harvard University. The meeting was part of an
unsuccessful attempt to develop an agenda for further discussion as part of a
Swiss initiative to review the application of international humanitarian law to
current armed conflicts. That an agreement could not be reached on even an
agenda for future discussions is telling indeed about the inherent difficulties of
the task, and perhaps provided a useful warning to Denmark and the
Copenhagen Process.
48 Winkler, supra note 37, at 6.
49 Id.
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acceptance of the legal considerations involved."5 0 What exactly
that means remains unclear-but careful examination of the
process indicates that it will involve coordination and
reconciliation of LOIAC with international human rights norms.
The first Copenhagen Conference was held in October 2007. It
included representatives from states and international
organizations, including the United Nations and the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Its purpose was "to discuss the
handling of detainees in international military operations" 51
According to the Danish Ambassador to the United Nations, "the
discussions during the First Copenhagen Conference clearly
showed that the challenge was not the elaboration of new rules,
but to make the existing legal framework fully applicable in
practice."5 2 The Danish Undersecretary for Legal Affairs has
echoed that view and even posited that nongovernmental
organizations also believe that there are no gaps in LOIAC.53 But
whether or not gaps exist, the conference made clear that LOIAC
and international human rights law are increasingly entangled.
For example, the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs noted that while
Danish soldiers were engaged in direct combat with the Taliban in
the valleys of Afghanistan's Helman province, such action is a non-
international armed conflict, with LOIAC as the lex specialis.5 4 This,
according to the Undersecretary, is in contrast with the operations
of nearby Danish Soldiers "who are patrolling the more peaceful
areas in the North of Helman, and who may happen to detain a
person outside the framework of the armed conflict, has to adhere
to human rights law."55 Accordingly, whether or not gaps exist in
LOIAC, it is recognized that an understanding of international
50 Id.
51 Letter from the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Information for the Secretary-General's Report on the Status
of the Additional Protocols Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed
Conflicts and on Measures to Strengthen the Existing Body of International
Humanitarian Law (July 1, 2008) (on file with authors).
52 Marie-Louise Overvad, Danish Ambassador to the United Nations,
Statement at the Thirtieth International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red




53 Taksoe-Jensen, supra note 41, at 6.
54 Id. at 7.
55 Id.
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human rights law is critical for military commanders engaging in
detainee operations.
How much momentum the Copenhagen Process still has is
unclear.5 6 If the momentum wanes, other options towards a
similar end may include refocusing attention on Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions or different initiatives such
as the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, which is a "new
intergovernmental advisory body of the United Nations that
supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict."5 7 The
Commission was established by both General Assembly and
Security Council Resolutions and among its roles is to "bring[]
together all of the relevant actors" and to "highlight[] any gaps that
threaten to undermine peace."58 Whatever the path forward, one
may rest assured that international human rights instruments will
form a key part of the considerations.
4. CONCLUSION
The nature of contemporary stability operations and
counterinsurgency has broadened the scope of military operations
so that commanders must now engage in a range of activities
outside of those normally considered combat-related. 59  The
56 Of note, in 2008 the Copenhagen Process held a roundtable in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia. While the origins of the process was to discuss European
countries' detainee experiences in Afghanistan, African countries have potentially
much more to contribute and to gain. As of 2006, 75% of U.N. Peacekeeping
Missions were in Africa and four of the top ten troop contributing countries were
from Africa. See INST. SEC. STUD., Africa to Look at Copenhagen Process on Handling
Detainees, May 16, 2008, http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?linkid=5&slink
_id=5951&link_type=12&slink type=12&tmpl-id=3.
57 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, http://www.un.org/peace
/peacebuilding/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing the functions of the
United Nations Peacebuilding Commission).
58 Id.
59 As the Field Manuel on Counterinsurgency notes,
U.S. forces committed to a[n] [insurgency and counterinsurgency] effort
are there to assist a [host-nation] government. The long-term goal is to
leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation has
to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local
leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but [host-
nation] elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory.
While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations
themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions
and then assist them. [Host-nation] governments have the final
responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies
are seen as interlopers and occupiers; the sooner the main effort can
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examples above only offer a limited glimpse of these
responsibilities. Others include dealing with displaced civilians,
responding to humanitarian catastrophes, and a host of other
activities which make modern military service appreciably
different than it was only a few decades ago. Concomitant with
this expanded range of military responsibility is an expanded
range of legal responsibility which necessarily implicates different
areas of law, principally international human rights law. As
demonstrated above, the most dramatic trend for LOIAC in the
past decade (and one which will doubtlessly continue) is the
increasing salience of international human rights law in the
juridico-military calculus. The processes and developments
emphasized in this Essay are only a sample of the ongoing
metamorphoses. Almost a decade ago, Theodor Meron termed this
phenomenon the "humanization of humanitarian law." 60 The new
shape of military operations and future legal trends portend a
continued - and perhaps accelerated - process of humanization.
unacceptable
1-147 (Dec. 2006).
transition to [host-nation] institutions, without
degradation, the better.
U.S. DEPT OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY,
60 Meron, supra note 9.
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